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THE CHANGING RULES OF JUS AD BELLUM: CONFLICTS IN 
KOSOVO, IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN 
W Scholtz* 
1 Introduction 
The launching of Operation Desert Storm against Iraq in 1991 was initiated on 
the basis of Security Council Resolution 678 of 1990. This action was 
characterized by agreement amongst various members of the United Nations 
(UN) and the question of the legality of this operation was not really in dispute. 
Subsequent armed attacks by especially the United States of America (USA) 
and the United Kingdom (UK) against Iraq has resulted in disagreement 
regarding the legality of these actions.
1  
Gross violations of human rights in Kosovo have lead to armed intervention in 
1999, which has been coined "humanitarian intervention" by various 
international lawyers. This concept has also sparked a debate regarding the 
legality of the notion in terms of international public law.
2 It is frequently asked 
if this concept complies with the jus ad bellum.
3 The legality of the use of 
armed force against Afghanistan is also debatable.
4 The disagreement 
regarding the use of force against Iraq reached an all time high when mainly 
the USA, UK and Australian forces attacked Iraq in 2003. These attacks 
resulted in international resistance.  
The latter examples of the usage of armed force differ in nature. The Kosovo 
incident relates to the issue of humanitarian intervention, the armed attack on 
Afghanistan was based on a form of self-defence while Iraq was attacked on 
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the ground of pre-emptive defence. Although these forms of the application of 
armed force are very different in terms of grounds of justification, they do raise 
difficult questions regarding the application of the jus ad bellum and potential 
amendments to these rules in international public law.  
It accordingly is the main purpose of this article to establish what the effects of 
these instances of the use of armed force are on the jus ad bellum. General 
rules pertaining to the use of force will be briefly sketched in the first part of 
this article. It is not the intent of the author to provide an extensive analysis in 
this regard as the application of the jus ad bellum in relation to the examples 
of the use of force will clarify various aspects of the general rules. The notion 
and legality of humanitarian intervention will subsequently receive attention in 
paragraph 3.  The attacks on Afghanistan will briefly receive attention in 
paragraph 4 as to ascertain whether these attacks were legal in terms of 
international public law. Paragraph 5 of this article will focus on the legality of 
the attack on Iraq. A conclusion regarding the effects of these conflicts in 
relation to the jus ad bellum will be drawn from these examples.  
 
2   The use of force in terms of international law  
Article 2(4)
5 of the Charter of the United Nations
6  contains the basic 
prohibition on the use of force
7 in international relations.
8 The UN Charter 
requires that disputes be settled by peaceful means.
9 Article 1(1) reads that 
the first purpose of the UN is to maintain international peace and security and 
to prevent threats of peace. The use of unilateral force will therefore 
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contravene the principles of the Charter. Article 51 and chapter VII contains 
the two exceptions to the prohibition of the use of force as embodied in article 
2(4). Article 51 makes provision for the right of individual or collective self-
defence in the instance of an armed attack. A state may engage the right of 
self-defence until the Security Council has taken action. The measures taken 
in terms of self-defence must be immediately reported to the Security Council. 
It is interesting to note that recourse to self-defence is limited due to the fact 
that it can only be applicable in the instance of an armed attack. Chapter VII 
contains the second exception to article 2(4) as it provides for the use of force 
to counter the threats and breaches of international peace and security as 
well as acts of aggression, in the form of administering economic and/or 
military sanctions or authorizing collective military action. Article 42 enables 
the Security Council to impose military sanctions in order to maintain or 
restore international peace. 
 
3   The use of armed force for humanitarian reasons  
3.1   Introduction  
It is not the intention of this article to focus on the history of the Kosovo crisis 
as other authors have done this in detail.
10 It would suffice to briefly focus on 
the developments that lead to the NATO intervention. The escalating conflict 
between Kosovar Albanians and ethnic Serbs resulted in the outbreak of a 
civil war. At the end of 1998 Serb-forces continued to build up in Kosovo and 
atrocities were being committed against Albanians. Two rounds of peace talks 
between representatives of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and the 
Kosovar Albanians had failed and the FRY had refused to sign the American-
drafted Rambouillet agreement. NATO subsequently carried out air strikes 
against the FRY. The Security Council did not provide authorization for the 
aerial campaigns of NATO in Kosovo and the actions of NATO do not 
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constitute collective self-defence.
11 The question accordingly arises whether 
article 2(4) makes provision for the use of force in instances other than self-
defence and authorization by the Security Council. Is the use of force for 
humanitarian ends justified? May force therefore be used to prevent or 
suppress atrocities and massive violations of human rights as in the case of 
Kosovo? The events that took place in 1998-1999 in Kosovo have placed a 
great deal of focus on the concept of "humanitarian intervention" and it 
compelled international lawyers to revisit this notion.
12 This concept has 
received a great deal of attention and has been the source of a lively debate 
in the field of international public law.
13 The term "humanitarian intervention" is 
used where a state or several states use armed force against another state in 
order to enforce and protect human rights.
14 The UN Charter does not 
explicitly deal with humanitarian intervention. The fact that the Security 
Council has the power to authorize coercive intervention does not mean that 
this authority is easily invoked.
15 The Security Council has the primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.
16 Article 
39 of the UN Charter states that the Security Council shall determine the 
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression 
and it can take measures involving the use of force in response. The effect of 
article 27(3) of the UN Charter i s  t h a t  a  Security Council Resolution to 
authorize intervention is subject to the consent of any of the five permanent 
members. A single permanent member can therefore prevent the 
authorization of humanitarian intervention.
17 The authority also requires an 
affirmative vote by nine members of the fifteen Council members. This 
procedure has proved not to be efficacious.
18 An example of this is the 
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instance where China vetoed a draft resolution that was aimed at the 
extension of the presence of peacekeeping forces in Macedonia for another 
six months. Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Slovenia, the 
UK and the USA sponsored the draft resolution.
19 Thirteen states voted in 
favour of this resolution while Russia abstained from voting. The requirements 
in article 27(3) may lead to a situation where a state or group of states uses 
force to secure human rights in other states in the absence of the 
authorization of the Security Council.  
It is accordingly important to dissect the various possible justifications that 
may exist for the usage of force on the basis of humanitarian intervention.  
3.2   Textual interpretation of article 2(4) of the UN Charter  
Certain scholars argue that article 2(4) does not prohibit unilateral force in 
general, but force against the political independence and territorial integrity of 
a state or recourse to force inconsistent with the principles of the UN 
Charter.
20 In terms of this argument the use of force to protect human rights is 
not directed against the political independence and territorial integrity of a 
state and it is not inconsistent with the purposes of the Charter as respect for 
human rights is one of the aims thereof.
21 The use of force is accordingly 
justified to end atrocities and large-scale deprivation of life and humanitarian 
intervention does not violate article 2(4). This argument is, however, flawed 
and cannot be accepted.
22 The terms "territorial integrity" and "political 
independence" do not restrict the scope of the prohibition of the use of force 
and cover any kind of transboundary use of armed force.
23 Most forms of the 
implementation of armed force therefore falls under the first two prohibitions 
and any other forms are covered by the catch-all phrase which outlaws the 
threat or the use of force "in any matter inconsistent with the Purposes of the 
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United Nations". It is after all the main purpose of the UN Charter to ensure 
the maintenance of peace.
24 
3.3   The role of the sovereignty of states  
The international legal system has undergone changes since the founding 
of the UN. State sovereignty was to a great extent the center of attention 
when the Charter came into force.
25 Article 2(7) contains a reference to the 
state sovereignty of members of the UN.
26 Reisman
27 is of the opinion that:   
None of us who are compelled to ask hard questions about the 
lawfulness of the Kosovo action is a consistent strict constructionist of 
the Charter. After all, who amongst us insists on a textual 
interpretation of article 2(7)? But we are all stricter when it comes to 
reading article 2(4). 
It is accordingly reasoned that the flexible interpretation of article 2(7) has an 
effect on article 2(4). The basis for this argument is that the defense of 
domestic jurisdiction in terms of sovereignty cannot be used as an excuse for 
human rights violations.
28 The right to violate human rights in a gross fashion 
is therefore removed from the sphere of political independence. It is argued 
that the UN Charter cannot be changed without resulting in adjustments in 
other parts of the Charter. The argument furthermore entails that the 
inefficiency of the procedures of the Security Council results in a lack of action 
where humanitarian intervention is needed and it is not practical that the 
council  has the exclusive power to decide in these circumstances which 
course of action must be undertaken. The question accordingly arises whether 
this argument can find support?  
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State sovereignty does not entail that a state as a member of the international 
community is free from certain responsibilities to its own citizens and to other 
members of the international community.
29 The international dimension to 
various activities, such as transboundary pollution, has lead to the 
development of international regulations to ensure the effective management 
of such issues.
30 This leads to a situation where the notion of sovereignty is 
changing in those areas, which were considered to be within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of States. This indeed allows for a more flexible approach 
regarding the interpretation of article 2(7). The notion of state sovereignty 
must be viewed in the context of the three sets of values that form the basis 
for inter-state relations: peace,
31 human rights
32 and self-determination.
33 
They constitute a hierarchy of values in the sense that peace must always be 
the ultimate purpose where a conflict arises between the values. These 
values can be interdependent in various instances. The existence of peace 
may be dependent on the adherence to the protection of international human 
rights. The fact that peace is the highest value does not mitigate the 
importance of the other values as well as the role of these values in the 
promotion of peace.
34 Articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter implore all 
members to take action to promote respect for and observance of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms for all. The broad acceptance of human 
rights also has an influence on the concept of state sovereignty.
35 Reliance on 
state sovereignty in terms of article 2(7) can no longer serve as a reason for 
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non-intervention where gross violations of human rights are committed. 
Sovereignty therefore entails, in the field of human rights, that the power of 
the state must be restricted and that the state has an obligation in this regard 
to protect the human rights of its citizens.
36 The state must furthermore also 
serve as an agent to protect its citizens from harm from other parties, such as 
third states. The responsible exercise of sovereignty can promote human 
rights just as the irresponsible exercise thereof can be to the disadvantage of 
human rights. 
It is very important to realize that the acceptance of the flexible approach to 
sovereignty, does not imply that article 2(4) can be interpreted in a way that 
permits the use of unilateral armed force for humanitarian reasons. This will 
render the content of article 2(4) meaningless. Articles 2(7) and 2(4) 
furthermore differ as article 2(4) is a jus cogens norm whereas article 2(7) 
does not have the same status.
37 The fact that article 2(7) has been given 
content regarding the implication of sovereignty in relation to the other values 
in the Charter, does not imply that humanitarian intervention in the absence of 
authorization of the Security Council can be accepted.
38 The fact that a state 
exercises its sovereignty in a way that does not pay heed to human rights 
does not warrant illegal unauthorized intervention and a violation of article 
2(4).  
3.4   Humanitarian intervention as an emerging norm of customary law   
It has been argued that the use of armed force in Kosovo established the 
emergence of a new customary rule in favour of humanitarian intervention.
39 
The obligation of states to respect human rights is an obligation erga omnes 
and this implies that any state or a collective group of states has the right to 
take steps, excluding the unilateral use of force, to attain such a respect.
40 In 
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39   Byers 2002 EJIL 27.  
40   Strydom  1988/1989  SAYIL  52ff. The ICJ characterized obligations erga omnes as 
commitments towards the international community as a whole. Par 33 and 34; Barcelona 
Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd Second Phase, ICJ Reports 1970. Examples of W SCHOLTZ    PER 2004(2) 
9/37 
terms of this argument the resort to unilateral armed force for reasons of 
humanitarian intervention may gradually become justified under strict 
conditions. If a humanitarian intervention rule evolves in the world community, 
it would constitute an exception to the rule of collective enforcement based on 
the authorization of the Security Council. This would then serve as an 
exception similar to the exception in article 51.
41 In order to establish whether 
a rule can be recognized as customary international law, the requirements of 
opinio juris and usus  would need to be met.
42 In this instance these 
requirements will not be easily met. The G77 group issued an unequivocal 
statement that unilateral humanitarian intervention is illegal according to 
international law.
43 It would be hard to meet the requirement of usus due to 
the fact that unilateral humanitarian intervention is the exception rather than 
the rule.
44 In this regard some international scholars argue that only physical 
acts can be seen as State practice and therefore any State, which wants to 
oppose or support the formation of new customary law must act in a decisive 
manner.
45 According to this viewpoint mere statements or claims would not 
suffice. This viewpoint tends to give more influence to the powerful States in 
the formation of customary law. Literature in the United States suggests that 
more powerful States matter more regarding the formation of customary law.
46 
This notion violates the principle of sovereign equality.  
                                                                                                                                            
obligations erga omnes may be found in general international law as well as treaty law. 
See also par 40 of the separate opinion of Kooijmans j in Legal Consequences of the 
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion) ICJ 
Reports 2004. 
41    The exceptions would have some commonalities: they would be justified by special 
circumstances, must constitute an extrema ratio, must be strictly limited for the purpose 
of stopping the atrocities, must be proportionate and must yield to collective enforcement 
under UN authority as soon as possible.  
42   See Dugard International Law 24. 
43   Par 54; Declaration of G77 http://www.nam.gov.za/documentation/southdecl.htm 9 Jun. 
The 133 States that issued the declaration consists of Asian States, African States, Latin 
American States and Arab States. 
44   The ICJ in the Nicaragua case stated that: "while the United States might form its own 
appraisal of the situation as to respect for human rights in Nicaragua, the use of force 
could not be the appropriate method to monitor or ensure such respect" at par 268; Case 
Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v 
United States of America)(Merits Judgement) ICJ Reports 1986. Hereinafter referred to 
as the Nicaragua case.  
45   Byers 2002 EJIL 30. See for an extensive discussion pertaining to developments in this 
field: Roberts 2001 AJIL 757-791. 
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It must furthermore be kept in mind that article 2(4) is a jus cogens norm.
47 
This concept was codified in the Vienna Convention.
48 Article 53 states that a 
treaty shall be void if it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general 
international law as a norm accepted and recognized by the international 
community of states as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is 
permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general 
international law having the same character.
49 The violation of jus cogens 
norms is a violation against the international community as a whole and the 
use of force against one state implies the use of force against all states. It is 
therefore important to establish if the restrictions of the use of force have been 
changed by other norms of jus cogens. 
A  jus cogens norm has the highest hierarchical position among the other 
norms and principles of international law. Jus cogens norms are peremptory 
and non-derogable.
50 In order to achieve recognition as jus cogens, a norm 
must be accepted and recognized as a peremptory norm by the international 
community of states as a whole as indicated in article 53 of the Vienna 
Convention.
51 In the light of the importance of the norms in question, such an 
acceptance and recognition would not be lightly presumed. The fact that 
article 53 refers to the acceptance and recognition by the international 
community as a whole is a strict requirement for the creation of a jus cogens 
norm.  
In terms of the wording of article 53 a jus cogens norm can be amended by a 
norm of the same nature. Article 64 of the same Convention also makes 
provision for the emergence of a new peremptory norm of general 
international law. The modification of a jus cogens norm can only be done via 
                                                 
47   Charney  http://www.asil.org/ajil/kosovo.htm 9. See Strydom 1988/1989 SAYIL 44. 
Originally the notion of jus cogens applied only to treaty relationships. Subsequent 
developments have indicated the desire of the international community to apply this 
notion in a much broader context. Danilenko Law-Making 213.  
48   Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, hereinafter referred to as the Vienna 
Convention. 
49    It is very controversial whether the concept of jus cogens is applicable outside the 
domain of treaty law. See De Wet Powers of the UN 187. The Charter is also a treaty.  
50   See the discussion in Danilenko Law-Making 219ff.  
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a peremptory law-changing process that does not deviate from the original 
law-making process whereby the original norm was established.
52 Any 
modification could therefore only occur if it is sanctioned by a new norm, 
which is accepted and recognized as provided for in article 53 of the Vienna 
Convention.  The customary process can therefore not be a suitable 
mechanism to amend jus cogens norms in a treaty due to the fact that acts 
constituting new practice aimed at modification of such a jus cogens rule 
would be invalid ab initio. The consent of other states not to adhere to the 
existing norm of jus cogens does not change the situation. The modification of 
an existing jus cogens norm in a treaty must take place via  a general 
multilateral treaty that embodies a peremptory norm that is in line with article 
53. It must furthermore be taken into account that it is doubtful that a 
customary norm in favour of humanitarian intervention has emerged. The jus 
cogens restrictions relating to the recourse to armed force were and are not 
changed by the actions in Kosovo.
53  
3.5   Other justifications for humanitarian intervention   
The concept of humanitarian intervention cannot be supported by the 
existence of a rule of customary international law in this regard. The question 
may therefore be asked whether the concept of humanitarian intervention can 
be justified on other grounds. It would be worthwhile to briefly focus on 
arguments of various scholars in this regard. Schachter is of the opinion that it 
is undesirable to allow a rule of humanitarian intervention and that it would be 
better to acquiesce in a violation that is considered necessary and desirable.
54 
Henkin also follows the same line of reasoning and is of the opinion that the 
lesson of Kosovo is that states will first act and then challenge the Security 
Council to terminate the action.
55 A permanent member of the council  could 
by means of a veto ensure that such a resolution is not adopted. The Security 
Council will therefore acquiesce in the decision to intervene. Henkin finds 
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support for his statement in the adoption of Resolution  1244.
56 This 
Resolution seems to ignore the events that took place prior to its existence. 
This  Resolution  does not condemn the use of force against the FRY and 
indeed does not even make mention of it. It is, however, questionable whether 
this resolution serves as evidence for the acquiescence of the intervention. It 
is through this resolution that the Security Council took control of the situation 
in Kosovo and addressed urgent matters in terms of a pragmatic approach. 
This "supposed realist" approach of Henkin and Schachter undermines the 
existence of international public law regarding recourse to armed conflict.
57 
The fact that ex post facto acceptance of the intervention takes place does not 
change the fact that recourse to armed conflict might have been illegal. This 
pragmatic acceptance of illegality opens up a wide gap for abuse. The 
"supposed realist" approach constitutes an acceptance of the contravention of 
international law "where it is necessary and desirable". States may 
accordingly choose to breach international law in these circumstances. It is 
clear that danger also exists where the contravention of law on the basis of 
unclear criteria is accepted.  
Doehring has defended the notion of humanitarian intervention with an 
analogous application of article 51 of the Charter.
58 In terms of this concept 
gross violations of human rights give rise to a breach of obligations erga 
omnes. The argument is that article 51 finds analogous application and can 
be used as a justification ground for intervention due to the fact that these 
violations are mostly accompanied by an element of force. Doehring further 
argues that oppressed people have legal subjectivity and that gross violations 
of human rights give rise to a right to self-defence analogous to the right 
contained in article 51. Other States, as carriers of legal subjectivity, can 
                                                 
56   Security Council Resolution 1244 of 1999. 
57    Moore identifies two wrong schools of thought on the subject of jus ad bellum. The 
"supposed realist" school is the group that is of the opinion that international rules are not 
really enforced and therefore not important. They tend to ignore the importance of 
international public law and the prohibition against aggression. The "minimalists" do not 
focus on the illegality of an attack, but rather curtail the right of self-defence through a 
variety of implausible interpretations of the UN Charter. This group also ignores the 
importance of the role of law in deterring aggression. Moore http://www.fed-
soc.org/Publication/Transcripts/useofforce.htm 10 Jun. 
58   Doehring Völkerrecht 432.  W SCHOLTZ    PER 2004(2) 
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therefore provide "emergency help" (Nothilfe) to oppressed individuals. The 
arguments of Doehring are based on moral considerations, which are not 
supported by international law. This is also clear from the statement of 
Doehring that it would be absurd to accept that the Charter prohibits 
humanitarian intervention where this could save lives.
59 The analogous 
application of article 51 cannot be supported, because article 51 should be 
interpreted restrictively.
60 The prevailing opinion furthermore rules out the use 
of force as a permissible countermeasure in the case of the violation of 
obligations erga omnes.
61  
Various authors have tried to draw up conditions under which humanitarian 
intervention can be permissible.
62 These criteria cannot, however, transform 
an illegal intervention into a lawful one. Criteria for humanitarian intervention 
may be useful in the instance where the Charter is amended to provide for 
this concept under strict conditions. Established criteria can then serve as 
conditions, which must be complied with in order to constitute humanitarian 
intervention. It is in this context of interest to focus on the deliberations of the 
Axworthy Commission. This international commission is concerned with the 
question whether and when it is permissible to implement humanitarian 
intervention.
63 The Axworthy Commission has drafted principles and grounds 
for humanitarian intervention, which must ensure that states do not use the 
concept of humanitarian intervention for their own selfish interests. In terms of 
the principles of the Commission, humanitarian intervention may only take 
place when a high loss of human life has already occurred or is feared or 
where an ethnical cleansing has started or is feared. It is furthermore stated 
that members should pursue authorization through the Security Council. The 
Commission proposes that the five permanent members of the Security 
Council must agree that they will refrain from making use of their veto right to 
impair the approval of a resolution aimed at humanitarian intervention, which 
                                                 
59   Doehring Völkerrecht 436.  
60   Randelzhofer The Charter 677. 
61   Hilpold 2001 EJIL 453.  
62   See for instance: Cassese 1999 EJIL 27; Thürer 2000 Archiv des Völkerrechts 7. 
63   Williams 2002 Vereinte Nationen Zeitschrift für die VN 10ff. It is not the intention of this 
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is supported by the majority of the members. Members must refrain from 
using their veto right where the national interests of members are not affected. 
In the instances where the Security Council refuses a motion for humanitarian 
intervention this proposal may be taken to the General Assembly or measures 
may be taken in terms of chapter 8 of the Charter, provided that subsequent 
authorization will be sought. This principle opens up the possibility for regional 
organizations to first act in contravention with article 2(4) and then to seek 
retroactive justification for their actions. This is clearly not an optimal 
approach and may lead to abuse. Another problem with these grounds and 
principles for humanitarian intervention is that it may be possible for a 
powerful state to indicate that the requirements for the justification of 
humanitarian intervention are met and such a state may then pursue its own 
self-interest. It is also doubtful whether powerful states will adhere to the 
proposed grounds and principles in the instance where they pursue self-
interest. The requirements of a high loss of life and ethnical cleansing can 
also be subjective in nature and states may manipulate this to suit their own 
needs. Although critique may be voiced against the proposals of the 
Commission, the results of the deliberations of this commission may prove to 
be useful in the event where the Charter can be amended to introduce the 
concept of humanitarian intervention.  
The armed intervention in Kosovo is illegal due to the fact that it is in 
contravention of article 2(4) of the UN Charter. The acceptance of the 
emergence of a customary rule of humanitarian intervention is not supported 
by evidence. Various concerns furthermore exist in this regard. The fear exists 
that the use of force is once more becoming an accepted means of 
conducting international affairs whereby the interests of a small group of 
powerful states are promoted.
64 This development takes place in line with the 
development of a concept of "limited sovereignty" in favour of the more 
powerful states.
65 The arguments contesting the concept of humanitarian 
intervention highlight the dangers that may accompany the introduction of the 
concept of armed intervention without the permission of the Security Council. 
                                                 
64   Köchler http://www.i-p-o.org/koechler-intervention.pdf 20 Jun. W SCHOLTZ    PER 2004(2) 
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It is most probable that major powers will abuse the notion of humanitarian 
intervention and apply the will of a collective entity, under the supervision of a 
single superpower, which may be detrimental to the individuals in a particular 
state. It is not without good reason that the restrictions to the recourse of 
armed force are jus cogens. Caution should be applied to ensure that armed 
force is not a resort for a few major powers that decide unilaterally when and 
where to use it. A few state actors should not acquire the privilege to regulate 
the international plane and to rewrite international law as they please. The 
need to intervene in situations where atrocities against humanity are 
committed has lead to the development of arguments that intend to justify the 
use of unilateral armed force for humanitarian purposes. It is clear that most 
of these arguments are superficial and does not satisfy questions regarding 
the legality of humanitarian intervention. These arguments merely reflect a 
notion of reality that international public law does not provide for unilateral 
humanitarian intervention. It is not useful to construct arguments that are not 
in line with the principles of international public law in order to justify the 
actions of major powers. The morality of these arguments is used as an 
excuse for the procedural shortcomings of the intervention in Kosovo. Morality 
is also a driving force behind the acceptance of the intervention in Kosovo.  
The status quo regarding humanitarian intervention provides the legal scholar 
with a moral dilemma due to the fact that it supposes that gross violations of 
human rights may occur without any intervention where the Security Council 
has not provided authorization due to the differences amongst members. 
Certain powers may have recourse to armed force without permission of the 
Security Council where atrocities take place. The moral inclination to take 
action must, however, be distinguished from the legal questions regarding 
humanitarian intervention. The restrictions pertaining to armed force are 
necessary to ensure that the major powers do not rewrite international law 
based on a concept of the use of force based on the excuse of humanitarian 
intervention. This will result in anarchy in the field of international law.  
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4   Military actions in Afghanistan   
4.1   Introduction   
On September 11, 2001, the USA was the victim of attacks carried out by Al 
Qaeda members who crashed two commercial airplanes into the World Trade 
Center towers, one into the Pentagon and another into a field into Shanksville, 
Pennsylvania.
66 On October 7, 2001, President Bush invoked the United 
States' inherent right to self-defence and ordered U.S. armed forces to initiate 
action against members of Al Qaeda and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. 
The North Atlantic Council of NATO decided that the attack against the USA 
was an action covered by article 5 of the Washington Treaty, whereby an 
armed attack against one or more of the Allies in Europe or North America 
"shall be considered an attack against them all". The use of force in this 
regard was essentially based on article 51 of the Charter.
67  The Security 
Council has not adopted a resolution under chapter VII of the Charter to 
authorize the use of force.
68 The use of armed force in this instance is 
furthermore clearly not a case of humanitarian intervention.
69 The actions 
against Afghanistan have accordingly resulted in a debate regarding the 
legality of these actions.
70 Various authors have engaged in this debate and it 
would not be meaningful to duplicate these contributions.
71 It would suffice for 
the purpose of this article to briefly reflect on the effect of these actions in 
Afghanistan in relation to the jus ad bellum.  
4.2   Justifications for the attacks against Afghanistan   
                                                 
66   See for an extensive description of the facts: Murphy 2002 AJIL 237ff.  
67   Stahn 2002 ZaoRV 211. 
68   See Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373 of 2001. Resolution 1368 reaffirms the 
inherent right of individual and collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter, 
while Resolution 1373 obliges all member states to deny financing, support and safe 
haven to terrorists. These resolutions did not authorize self-defence in terms of ch VII of 
the Charter. 
69   Ibid. 
70   See for instance editorial comments 2001 AJIL 833. 
71   See for instance: Franck 2001 95 AJIL 839. See also the contributions of various authors 
at: http://www.ejil.org/forum_WTC/ and http://www.asil.org/terrorind.htm 2 Aug.  W SCHOLTZ    PER 2004(2) 
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The reliance on article 51 of the Charter for the justification of the attacks 
against Afghanistan implies that the attacks against the USA must have been 
"armed attacks" as provided for in the provision of article 51. The historical 
context of article 51 of the Charter suggests that armed attacks only relate to 
attacks between states.
72 A theological reading of article 51, however, 
supports an interpretation that focuses on the impact of the attack rather than 
the origin of the attack.
73 The gravity of the attacks on the USA may therefore 
constitute an "armed attack" if a theological approach of article 51 is followed. 
A second prerequisite is the fact that self-defence in terms of article 51 must 
be directed against the state, which was responsible for the armed attack if 
the territorial sovereignty of that state is infringed. Originally self-defence was 
only justified where it was directed against states and not other entities.
74 In 
the instance of the Afghanistan conflict, Al Qaeda was responsible for the 
attacks against the USA. The actions of the Al Qaeda were attributed to the 
Taliban regime and the state of Afghanistan.
75 The reason for the attack of the 
state of Afghanistan was the fact that Afghanistan supposedly allowed Al 
Qaeda to undertake terrorist attacks against the USA and did not take action 
to put an end to the actions of this entity. This issue raises the question 
whether the mere harbouring of terrorists is sufficient to hold a state 
accountable for an armed attack. It must be noted in this regard that states 
may incur legal responsibility for tolerating terrorism from its territory.
76 Even if 
it can be argued that Afghanistan failed to comply with its obligations in terms 
of international law, this still does not warrant self-defence in terms of article 
51. State responsibility for harbouring terrorists must be distinguished from 
state responsibility for an armed attack on another state by the same 
                                                 
72   This is supported by a 1 of the Definition of Aggression GA Resolution 3314. The ICJ 
largely equated the definition of aggression with the concept of an "armed attack" at 
Nicaragua case par 195.  
73   See Mégret http://www.ejil.org/forum_WTC/ 3 Aug. Stahn 2002 ZaoRV 213. See also par 
35 of the separate opinion of Kooijmans j in Legal Consequences of the Construction of 
a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion) ICJ Reports 2004.  
74   Mégret http://www.ejil.org/forum_WTC/ 19.  
75   Murphy AJIL 245 and 246.  
76   See for instance the Declaration on Principles of International Law GA Resolution 2625 
(XXV), 24 October 1975. This declaration inter alia states that: "Every State has a duty to 
refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting, or participating in … terrorist acts in 
another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards 
the commission of such acts."  W SCHOLTZ    PER 2004(2) 
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terrorists. The question accordingly arises whether Afghanistan can be held 
responsible for the armed attacks of Al Qaeda against the USA. The 
International Court of Justice adopted the so-called "effective control" test, in 
terms of which a state can be liable for the acts of those over whom it has 
effective control.
77 The court held that a high degree of control over a military 
group was necessary and that the control be exercised with respect to the 
specific relevant operation. The mere assistance in the form of the provision 
of weapons or logistical support would not constitute an armed attack. The 
tolerance of the presence of terrorists on a state's territory is an insufficient 
reason in terms of present international law to impute to the host an armed 
attack of the terrorists.
78 The "effective control" test is not fulfilled in the 
instance of the Afghanistan case. It seems that in the instance of Afghanistan, 
Al Qaeda had effective control over the Afghanistan regime.
79   
Although the attacks on the USA were horrific and condemned by most 
international actors, it is a different question whether the armed response of 
the USA was valid in terms of international law. A few problems arise 
regarding this scenario. The fact that a non-state actor instituted the armed 
attack may be seen as an obstacle to the legitimacy of the actions of the USA. 
In terms of a theological approach it is possible to construct the attack as an 
                                                 
77   Par 105, 119 and 230; Nicaragua case. 
78   Mégret http://www.ejil.org/forum_WTC/ 23. See for an opposing view Stahn 2002 ZaoRV 
221. Stahn is of the view that the "overall control" test as adopted by the Appeals 
Chamber of the ICTY in the Tadic case may be fulfilled in the Afghanistan case. In terms 
of this test, control required by international law may be deemed to exist when a State or 
a Party to the conflict has a role in organizing, coordinating or planning the military 
actions of the group, in addition to financing, training and equipping or providing 
operational support to that group. Par 137; ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Tadic 
ILM (1999) 1518. In terms of this argument a 9 of the ILC Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility, which makes provision for the attribution of non-state actors in failed state 
scenarios, such as Afghanistan is furthermore applicable. It is, however, doubtful that this 
reasoning depicts the requirements in terms of international law. It must be noted that the 
legal issues and factual situation in the Tadic case differed from the Nicaragua case. The 
issue before the Tribunal was that of individual responsibility and the applicable rules of 
humanitarian international law. It is also worthwhile to take notice of the Tehran Hostage 
case where the Court formulated the "subsequent approval" formula in terms of which 
subsequent approval or endorsement of wrongful acts may provide evidence of state 
responsibility. Par 67; Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in 
Tehran (United States of America v Iran) ICJ Report 1980. This test should be applied 
with caution in the instances of a 51 as it related to the responsibility of Iran in terms of 
the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations.  
79   Mégret http://www.ejil.org/forum_WTC/ 24.  W SCHOLTZ    PER 2004(2) 
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"armed attack" as required by article 51. A second more problematic issue is 
the question whether the actions of Al Qaeda can be attributed to the de facto 
regime of Afghanistan.
80 This is due to the fact that the Taliban was the target 
of attack in response to the terrorist actions against the USA. In this instance 
the "effective control" test is not fulfilled and the acts of Al Qaeda cannot be 
attributed to the Taliban, which implies that article 51 cannot serve as a legal 
ground for the actions of the USA. The armed attack of the USA against 
Afghanistan was therefore in contravention of article 2(4). 
 
5   The legality of the use of force against Iraq  
5.1   Authorisation by the Security Council  
In order to determine the legality of the recent attacks on Iraq, it must be 
established if the UN Security Council resolutions relating to Iraq have 
authorised the actions of the USA and the UK. It must be borne in mind that 
the Security Council has not passed a resolution authorising the use of 
force since Resolution 678
81 was adopted at the start of the Gulf War. This 
resolution authorised Member States "to use all necessary means to uphold 
and implement Resolution  660
82 and all subsequent relevant resolutions 
and to restore international peace and security in the area". The primary 
purpose of Resolution 660 was to restore the sovereignty of Kuwait. After 
the purpose of Resolution 678 was served, a cease-fire was embodied in 
Resolution 687
83. Iraq accepted the terms contained in the resolution and 
                                                 
80   It must be borne in mind that the territorial sovereignty of a de facto regime must also be 
respected. 
81   Security Council Resolution 678 of 1990. The ICJ also referred to the gravity of an attack 
in the Nicaragua case and emphasized that an armed attack must be on a greater scale 
and effects than a mere frontier incident. Par 195; Nicaragua case. Resolutions of the 
Security Council can be found at http://www.un.org/documents/scres.htm 2 Jun. All 
resolutions relating to Iraq can also be found at http://www.casi.org.uk/info/scriraq.html 2 
Jun. It is impossible to explore all resolutions pertaining to Iraq and therefore only the 
most relevant resolutions will be highlighted. 
82   Security Council Resolution 660 of 1990. 
83   Security Council Resolution 687 of 1991. W SCHOLTZ    PER 2004(2) 
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the provisional cease-fire in Resolution  686
84 was transformed into a 
permanent cease-fire.
85  
Two arguments in relation to the justification of attacks on Iraq in terms of 
Security Council Resolutions have been made. The USA and UK have 
argued that the failure of Iraq to comply with the terms of Resolution 687 
has renewed the authorisation to use force in terms of Resolution 678.
86 
The USA for example argued that Iraq had breached the cease-fire by its 
contravention of obligations in terms of Resolutions 687, 707
87, 715
88, 
1154
89, 1194
90 and 1205
91. The coalition forces therefore used force and 
initiated Operation Desert Fox in 1998 to uphold Resolution 678. Resolution 
687 contains a cease-fire agreement between Iraq and the United Nations 
that has the sole purpose to bring the Gulf War to an end. It furthermore 
contains requirements that Iraq needs to accept. The cease-fire was 
conditional on the acceptance of these terms. The cease-fire came into 
force due to the fact that Iraq accepted the requirements of the cease-fire.
92 
The general prohibition of force applied again in full and a material breach 
of the requirements of the cease-fire does not give individual members the 
right to use armed force without the authorisation of the Security Council.
93 
The Security Council is the party to the cease-fire and it must decide 
whether a material breach has occurred regarding the agreement and 
which type of response is needed. The argument of the US ignores the way 
in which the United Nations takes recourse to chapter VII of the Charter 
where the use of force is required. Limited resources and capacity 
problems restricted the UN to develop an enforcement mechanism against 
                                                 
84   Security Council Resolution 686 of 1991. 
85   Lobel and Ratner 1999 AJIL 148. Resolution 687 contains detailed requirements, such 
as the destruction of chemical and biological weapons with a range greater than one 
hundred and fifty kilometres; the setting up of a demilitarised zone; resolving the border 
dispute between Iraq and Kuwait and the continuance of economic sanctions against 
Iraq.  
86   Gray 2002 EJIL 12. 
87   Security Council Resolution 707 of 1991. 
88   Security Council Resolution 715 of 1995. 
89   Security Council Resolution 1154 of 1998. 
90   Security Council Resolution 1194 of 1998. 
91   Security Council Resolution 1205 of 1998. 
92   Lobel and Ratner 1999 AJIL 149.  
93   Lobel and Ratner 1999 AJIL 144; Murswiek 2003 NJW 1016.  W SCHOLTZ    PER 2004(2) 
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acts of aggression or breaches of peace.
94 The Security Council therefore 
needs to rely on its members to enforce military sanctions. This is done by 
way of authorisation through resolutions where the Security Council still 
remains in control. Individual members accordingly act under supervision 
and in terms of the authorisation of the Security Council. It would be absurd 
and contrary to the objectives of the Charter if an authorisation implied a 
permanent mandate for members to unilaterally decide when a cease-fire is 
breached and when force must be used. It is therefore for the Security 
Council to decide whether the contravention of a cease-fire agreement 
should be answered by resuming to the use of force.  
Another argument states that Security Council Resolutions implicitly 
authorised the use of force where Iraq has contravened its obligations.
95 
This argument has also been used to justify Operation Desert Fox when 
Iraq refused to co-operate with weapons inspectors. The UK and USA 
referred to Resolutions 1154 and 1205 as the basis for the justification of 
their actions. These resolutions did not expressly provide for the use of 
force. The first resolution stated that Iraq must allow unrestricted access to 
weapons inspectors and indicated that a violation of the resolution would 
have the severest consequences for Iraq.
96 Resolution 1205 condemned 
the decision of Iraq not to co-operate with the weapons inspectors.
97 It was 
therefore argued that Resolution 1205 revived the authority to use force 
contained in Resolution 678. The question is whether Resolution 1154 read 
with Resolution 1205 implicitly authorises the use of force. The Namibia 
Advisory Opinion
98  provides guidance in relation to the interpretation of 
resolutions of the Security Council and states that:  
                                                 
94   In terms of a 43 of the UN Charter, members were supposed to make forces available to 
the Security Council to ensure that the Security Council could enforce peace measures. 
This has not occurred. In terms of a 106 the implementation of military sanctions is, 
however, possible in the absence of the fulfilment of a 43. Randelzhofer The Charter 
127. 
95   Gray 2002 EJIL 11.  
96   Par 3.  
97   Par 1. 
98   Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia 
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The language of a resolution should be carefully analysed … having 
regard to the terms of the resolution to be interpreted, the discussions 
leading to it, the Charter provisions invoked and, in general, all 
circumstances that might assist in determining the legal 
consequences.  
The wording of Resolutions 1154 and 1205 makes it clear that the Security 
Council has not authorised the use of armed force. The Security Council 
did not repeat the phrasing in Resolution  678, which states that "all 
necessary means" be used. The usage of the phrase "severest 
consequences" is not an authorisation for Member States, but it rather 
serves as a warning for Iraq. During discussions in the Security Council 
following Operation Desert Fox
99 it was clear that the majority of Member 
States did not view Resolution 1205 as implicitly reviving the authority to 
use force in Resolution 678.
100 To allow members to act in terms of implied 
authorisation included in Security Council Resolutions would furthermore 
lead to the abuse of these resolutions. Member States may therefore 
declare that they are acting in terms of an implicit authorisation in order to 
promote self-interest. This would create legal uncertainty and would 
furthermore lead to the abuse of chapter VII. Accepting an implicit 
authorisation for the use of force would amount to a contravention of one of 
the main objectives of the UN Charter, which is the promotion of peace.  
Resolution 1441 is the latest resolution that contains extensive provisions 
regarding the weapons inspection regime.
101 This resolution does not 
contain an authorisation of the use of force against Iraq even when the 
latter does not comply with the obligations of the Resolution.
102 The 
wording of the resolution is to the effect that although it is recognized that 
                                                                                                                                            
Opinion ICJ Reports 1971. The court suggested an approach similar to that of a 31(1) of 
the Vienna Convention. 
99   The USA and UK instituted Operation Desert Fox in 1998 in response to fact that Iraq did 
not co-operate with UN weapon inspectors. 
100  Gray 2002 EJIL 12. This issue was also debated after the UK and USA attacked Iraq 
radar installations and command centres in February 2001. Russia, China and France 
viewed these strikes as illegal.  
101  Par ; Security Council Resolution 1441 of 2002.  
102  Par 1 states that Iraq is and has been in breach of previous resolutions, which includes 
Resolution 687. Par 13 refers to the fact that Iraq has been warned of the serious 
consequences it faces due to the violation of its obligations.  W SCHOLTZ    PER 2004(2) 
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Iraq is in material breach of its obligations, it is still the Security Council that 
needs to decide what the appropriate answer to this breach will be.
103 This 
resolution, just as the others, therefore does not serve as a legal basis for 
the attack on Iraq. The USA and UK therefore attacked Iraq without 
authorisation from the Security Council.  
5.2   The pre-emptive use of force 
The plan to attack Iraq was primarily based on the argument of the USA 
that Iraq has continued the development of weapons of mass destruction 
and might use these weapons against opponents or supply these weapons 
to terrorist networks.
104 The objective was to pre-empt this danger by 
removing the regime from power. This strategy is therefore based on the 
concept of pre-emptive self-defence.
105 Is this doctrine in line with article 51 
of the UN Charter? In terms of the wording of article 51 the element of 
armed attack must be present to invoke the notion of self-defence. This is 
supported by the ruling in the Nicaragua case that the right to self-defence 
exists only in the instance of an armed attack.
106 The court indicated that an 
armed attack does not only refer to action by regular forces across an 
international border, but may also include:  
[T]he sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, 
irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against 
another State of such gravity as to amount to … an actual armed 
attack conducted by regular forces. 
The Parties in this case did not rely on the issue of a threat of an imminent 
armed attack and the court therefore did not rule on this issue.
107 The 
question whether anticipatory self-defence will be lawful was therefore 
                                                 
103  Par 14 states that the Security Council "remain seized of the matter".  
104  O'Connel http://www.asil.org/taskforce/oconnell.pdf 12 Aug. 
105   President Bush referred to pre-emption at a Graduation Speech at West Point in May 
2002. To be found at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 2002/06/20020601-
3.html 2 Jun. This concept has also been included in the National Security Strategy of 
the USA of September 2002. To be found at: www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf  3 Jun.  
106  Par 194-195, 211; Nicaragua case.  
107  Par 194. W SCHOLTZ    PER 2004(2) 
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never addressed. The point in time from which measures of self-defence 
against an armed attack may be taken remains unclear.  
The Caroline case has been widely cited to answer this issue. This case 
has commonly been accepted as indicating when the customary law of self-
defence can be invoked. In terms of this case anticipatory self-defence is 
permitted when it can be shown that a "necessity of self-defence, instant, 
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for 
deliberation" exists.
108 This case, however, represented the customary law 
prior to the existence of the Charter and it is unclear whether article 51 
precludes the customary law in this regard and therefore precludes a right 
to anticipatory self-defence. This uncertainty stems from the inclusion of the 
term "inherent" in article 51. The prevailing view (and in the opinion of the 
author, correct view) is that, taking account of the objective of the Charter, 
article 51 excludes any self-defence other than that being launched in 
response to an armed attack.
109 It must be kept in mind that the customary 
right of self-defence is unclear and that its existence could even extend to 
the unilateral use of force by countries. The term "inherent" rather implies 
that the right of self-defence is also available to non-UN members. 
Disagreement exists amongst international lawyers regarding the point in 
time from which self-defence may be invoked.
110 The more correct view is 
that anticipatory self-defence is not recognized by article 51. The 
recognition of this doctrine may result in abuse as the requirements of this 
principle are vague and may be left to the discretion of States, which will 
easily justify their actions as anticipatory. Although this issue is of interest in 
relation to the law of force, it is not of much relevance regarding the Bush 
doctrine of pre-emptive force. This doctrine entails a right of self-defence 
                                                 
108  Harris International Law 848.  
109  Randelzhofer  The Charter 792. Brownlie also cautions against using the Caroline 
incident in isolation due to the fact that it relates to a period before the modern legal 
regime. Brownlie Rule of Law 203. 
110   See for various opinions: Harris International Law 849-851. O'Connel is of the opinion 
that anticipatory self-defence is allowed in terms of international law where it is in 
response to incipient attacks and ongoing campaigns. O'Connel 
http://www.asil.org/taskforce/oconnell.pdf 8 and 11. She is of the opinion that: "a state 
need not wait to suffer the actual blow before defending itself, so long as it is certain the 
blow is coming". Concurring, Murswiek 2003 NJW 1016-1018.  W SCHOLTZ    PER 2004(2) 
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for possible or potential threats that may occur in the future. Even the 
acceptance of a right to anticipatory self-defence based on the 
requirements of the Caroline case will not justify a right to pre-emptive 
defence. Pre-emptive defence relates to a hypothetical potential threat, 
which has not occurred or has not begun to occur. This scenario clearly 
exceeds the criteria of the Caroline case. The doctrine of pre-emptive strike 
is not recognized in terms of international public law and contravenes 
article 2(4).
111  
The pre-emptive strike doctrine is nothing more than offensive measures in 
disguise and does not adhere to the requirements of self-defence. Anarchy 
will be the result where other states follow the lead (and the doctrine) of the 
USA. States may decide that they do not trust other states which they 
regard as enemies and therefore invoke pre-emptive defence. This will 
undermine the international regime and will lead to a situation where force 
is an accepted mechanism of regulating international affairs. This was the 
view that was generally accepted by international lawyers in the nineteenth 
century when the distinction between bellum justum and bellum injustum 
was irrelevant.
112 The opinion exists that this acceptance:  
… brought the theory of law into accord with what had always been 
and still remained the facts of international practice."
113 
This statement came back to hunt international lawyers in the twenty first 
century due to the illegal invasion of Iraq by the USA. It seems that the 
theory of law has been brought into accord with the practice that the 
superpower will act in disregard of the international regime. It is, however, 
clear that it does not want other states to enjoy the same rights. Historically, 
the USA has argued against a right of pre-emptive self-defence and played 
a leading role in the adoption of the UN Charter.
114 The reason for the 
position of the USA was that although the Charter rules can restrict the 
                                                 
111   This statement is supported by O'Connel http://www.asil.org/taskforce/oconnell.pdf and 
Murswiek 2003 NJW 1018.  
112  Randelzhofer The Charter 114. 
113  Harris International Law 817.  
114  O'Connel http://www.asil.org/taskforce/oconnell.pdf 16.  W SCHOLTZ    PER 2004(2) 
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USA, it is worthwhile due to the fact that it restricts other states as well. It is 
clearly not in the interest of the USA if states invoke pre-emptive self-
defence in order to attack other states.  
The USA has decreed a new doctrine through its acts where it may not only 
choose to impose pre-emptive force: 
… when and where it chooses, but the nation will also punish those 
who engage in terror and aggression and will work to impose a 
universal moral clarity between good and evil."
115 
This pre-emptive defence will ultimately be employed to enforce good. 
These criteria are clearly vague. What is good and who has the 
competence to decide on this matter? The USA will ultimately decide what 
universal good entails. It has been argued that a situation may arise where 
a sui generis set of rules pertain to the USA and another set of rules apply 
to other states.
116 The acceptance of this line of argument once again 
reflects the view of a "supposed realist". The mere fact that the USA is 
acting as if a sui generis set of rules applies, does not mean that this 
violation of international law should be condoned by giving this non-
adherence legal status. The role of domination that the USA plays is not a 
basis for the creation of new rules pertaining to the formation of customary 
law. Realistic and unacceptable practice should be distinguished from what 
the law prescribes. The notion of a set of sui generis rules violates the 
principle of sovereign equality. Has this principle also been rewritten by the 
actions of the USA?
117 This is clearly not the case.
118 No doubt can 
therefore exist that the attack on Iraq was in contravention of article 2(4) of 
the UN Charter.  
                                                 
115  Graduation speech of George W Bush at West Point in May 2002.  
116  Byers 2002 EJIL 38.  
117  A 2(1) of the Charter. 
118  The  Charter  cannot be easily amended. In terms of a 103 the Charter for instance 
overrides all inconsistent treaties regardless of the date of their entry into force. A 108 of 
the Charter states that an amendment will come into force when it has been adopted by 
two thirds of the members of the General Assembly and ratified in terms of their 
constitutional processes by two thirds of the members of the UN, which must include all 
the permanent members of the Security Council.  W SCHOLTZ    PER 2004(2) 
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6   Conclusion 
This article explored three instances where primarily the USA and UK used 
force against other states during the past ten years. The purpose of this 
investigation is to examine the legality of the coercive measures in order to 
ascertain the effects that these actions had in relation to article 2(4) of the 
Charter. The proposed justifications for the attacks differ. In the instance of 
the use of armed force in Kosovo, the concept of humanitarian intervention 
was used as a ground for justification.
119 The attack on Afghanistan was in 
response to the terrorist attacks that were launched against the USA during 
2001. The use of force in Iraq was mainly based on the doctrine of pre-
emptive force. The reaction of the international community also differed in 
relation to these actions. The international community mostly granted support 
to the armed interventions that took place in Kosovo and Afghanistan, while 
the attack on Iraq was met by international resistance. These actions were 
more readily accepted by states in the instance of Kosovo due to the 
multilateral nature of the armed intervention as well as the moral compelling 
reasons to intervene. The gravity of the terrorist attacks in 2001 also 
contributed to the support that the USA received for its attack against 
Afghanistan. The attack on Iraq was against the wishes of the majority of the 
states of the world. The actions of the USA indicate that it may not perceive 
the  jus ad bellum to be binding and accordingly finds it unnecessary to 
engage in lengthy arguments to justify its actions. This is the result of the 
developments that took place especially during the past decade. The 
development of the notion of humanitarian intervention is a reaction to the 
atrocities committed in contravention of human rights and for which the 
Charter does not provide an adequate response. The doctrine of pre-emptive 
                                                 
119  It must be noted that he USA did not rely on the notion of humanitarian intervention to 
justify its actions, but it rather stressed political and moral considerations in this regard. 
The concept of humanitarian intervention is something, which authors of international 
public law have focused on. In the pending case before the ICJ, the Legality of the Use 
of Force, the defendant states did not rely on the concept of humanitarian intervention. 
Only Belgium referred to past practice regarding humanitarian intervention.  W SCHOLTZ    PER 2004(2) 
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force is also an apology of power for the actions of the USA. The attacks 
against Afghanistan in response to the September 11 attacks are also 
debatable. The commonality that exists between the three cases, is the 
illegality attached to the actions of primarily the USA and the UK.  
The failure of the Security Council to preserve peace implies that the United 
Nations has failed in the realization of one of its main objectives. The question 
is whether a solution could be found to ensure that the Security Council would 
be able to preserve peace? The way in which the Security Council needs to 
rely on the armed forces of members in order to deter aggression is the main 
source of the problem. This model may have opened the door for the abusive 
use of coercive measures by members of the Security Council. This was the 
case in Iraq in 2003 where certain members have subsequently illegally 
attacked Iraq on the basis of Resolution 678. This may have been different if 
the Security Council had troops at its disposal as envisaged in article 43 of the 
UN Charter. The Security Council would have direct command over the armed 
forces. Members that acted independently would then not be able to hide 
behind an implicit authorization in a resolution. It would therefore be logical to 
propose that article 43 must be adhered to. Article 43 has never been utilized 
and it is not envisaged that it would ever become operational.  
This would, however, not address the way in which article 27(3) determines 
the voting procedure of the Security Council, which makes provision for the 
right of a veto for a permanent member. This seems to be the main reason for 
members of the Security Council to act in the absence of authorization. The 
availability of armed forces to the Security Council would not solve this 
problem. It is most probable that the deployment of such a force would have 
been vetoed in the Kosovo case. This would also not have avoided the 
unilateral attack on Iraq, due to the lack of support for this action in the 
Security Council. The problem must be addressed at its source. Members can 
agree to an amendment of article 27 of the UN Charter, which will ensure a 
more efficient mechanism that could respond to threats of international peace. 
It is, however, the opinion of the author that this would also not be an optimal W SCHOLTZ    PER 2004(2) 
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solution.
120 Article 27 contains cumbersome provisions for a very good reason 
and that is to ensure that the object of ensuring international peace is not 
disturbed. This provision creates a system, which ensures that members of 
the Security Council does not abuse this mechanism to employ armed force 
against other States. It is clear from the objectives of the UN Charter and 
article 2(4) that the deployment of armed forces authorized by the Security 
Council cannot be easily undertaken. An amendment of article 27 would allow 
members of the Security Council to use the council to endorse its unilateral 
armed operations. This would frustrate the realization of international peace.  
This statement suggests that it does not seem that the Security Council will be 
successful in curtailing the illegal acts of major powers, such as the USA. This 
does not imply that article 2(4) is irrelevant. States should continue to support 
the  jus ad bellum and should not accept actions that contravene this 
provision. It is not perfect, but it is the only measure that can preclude anarchy 
relating to the use of force in the international arena. 
                                                 
120    It is therefore not worthwhile to investigate and propose an amendment. The strict 
requirements for amendment of the Charter, makes it doubtful whether such a proposal 
would even succeed.  W SCHOLTZ    PER 2004(2) 
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